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Hedelius Research Foundation.In a 1990 article published in (NRQRPLVN'HEDWW (the journal of the Swedish Economists’
Association) Walter Korpi, professor of sociology, began his crusade against the claim by
leading Swedish economists that Swedish growth performance has been secularly weak
relative to a broad average of comparable countries. The dramatic decline in the Swedish
economy in 1991–93 did not discourage Korpi in this mission; a large number of articles with
largely the same content on this issue has continued to appear even after an exchange in the
(FRQRPLF-RXUQDO in 1996. For example, in 1997–99 Korpi published extensive articles along
the same lines in Swedish in the leading political science journal and the journals of the
Swedish Sociologists’ Association and the Economic Society of Finland. The most recent
example is the article in the March/April 2000 issue of &KDOOHQJH, where the same arguments
are repeated in English. In all the above-mentioned cases I published critical scrutinies of
Korpi’s assertions. In Korpi’s contribution to &KDOOHQJH there is no indication that this in-
depth discussion and challenges of his assertions have ever taken place. In order to rectify the
misleading impression that comes out of Korpi’s papers, I find it important that readers of
&KDOOHQJH will get a chance to become acquainted with the counter-arguments.
Walter Korpi’s message can briefly be summarized as follows. Commanded by Assar
Lindbeck, Swedish academic economists at an early stage maintained that the Swedish
economy suffered from a growth problem, a result of the Swedish model characterized by a
large public sector and a number of institutional arrangements that evened out the distribution
of income both before and after tax. According to Korpi this assertion lacked an empirical
basis, since Swedish economic growth was comparable to that of other rich countries until a
macroeconomic crisis hit in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, leading politicians such as the
Social-Democratic Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (1986–91, 1994–96) and the Conservative
Prime Minister Carl Bildt (1991–94) were led astray by the economists’ erroneous message.
Earlier successful policies were abandoned and Sweden embarked on a new policy track
involving a major tax reform and comprehensive deregulation of product and capital markets.
This resulted in an economic crisis, and it is not until this “home-made” crisis becomes visible
in the macro data that one can identify Sweden as a laggard in terms of economic growth.
According to Korpi there are in principle two reasons why economists have communicated
this faulty message: (i) they are infatuated by their own theory and therefore they cannot
accept that a country like Sweden could perform well; (ii) for career reasons younger
economists are forced to claim that Sweden is lagging behind, even if this is at odds with the
facts. Korpi also tries to add additional credibility to his theses by referring to well known
discourses on values and scholarly objectivity in the social sciences (e.g., Myrdal, 1970 and
Hirschmann, 1991).2
In short, Korpi’s allegations are, to say the least, serious and they deserve a reply, which I and
other economists have produced on numerous occasions, although mostly in Swedish. In this
article the main arguments in this discussion against the validity of Korpi’s arguments will be
presented to an English-speaking audience.
Section 1 contains an examination of Sweden’s growth performance relative to other rich
countries during the postwar period. It is shown that a decline in relative performance is
apparent from 1970. Despite this fact Walter Korpi has tried to show that Swedish growth
performance was comparable to that of other rich countries at least until the early 1990s.
Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of how Korpi goes about to give this impression. In this
section I also examine the empirical support for Korpi’s thesis provided by Steve Dowrick
(1996). The upshot of this examination is that the Swedish relative decline began somewhat
earlier than previously thought. In Section 3 it is shown that the old Swedish model has been
thoroughly reformed since the mid 1980s and throughout the 1990s. If it turns out in hindsight
that Sweden has embarked on a steeper growth path after these reforms, this suggests that
there may have been some merits to the economists’ proposals for reform. In section 4 I
explore the factual basis for Korpi’s allegation that Swedish economists lacked in scholarly
objectivity when studying Sweden’s growth performance. The final section contains a brief
summary and the main conclusions.
1. Swedish growth performance relative to other comparable countries
In order to evaluate the relative performance of a specific country Walter Korpi correctly
argues in several articles that one has to compare a number of “natural experiments”. Thus, it
is appropriate to examine the development in all rich countries including a comparison with
one or several broad country aggregates. As a starting point, we note that from 1970 to 1998
GDP growth in Sweden was on average one percentage point below the OECD average (1.7
compared to 2.7 percent p.a.) and growth in GDP per capita was 0.6 percentage points below
the OECD average.1 But comparing income levels across countries is more difficult than
comparing growth rates. The best, albeit not perfect, comparability is probably achieved when
OECD’s purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted GDP per capita measures are used. 7DEOH
clearly shows how GDP per capita in Sweden developed very unfavorably relative to other
OECD countries in the period 1970–98. In 1970 Sweden had the fourth highest per capita
income level in the OECD. By 1990, the Swedish income level ranked a tied ninth position in
the OECD, despite that 1990 was an extreme boom year in Sweden with an unemployment
                                                          
1 OECD National Accounts Main Aggregates 1960–1997 Vol. 1, 1999 and OECD Main Economic Indicators,
February 2000.3
rate of 1.5 percent. By 1998 the Swedish income level had fallen to a tied 18
th position among
the OECD countries.
The comparability with other rich OECD countries increases if we exclude the two
developing countries Mexico and Turkey (plus the most recent members Poland, South
Korea, Hungary and the Czech Republic).2 In such a comparison Swedish PPP-adjusted per
capita income had fallen to a level six percent below the OECD average already in 1990,
when the economy went through the last stage of an unsustainable boom. In 1998 Swedish per
capita income was 15 percent below the average for the 23 richest OECD countries.3
7DEOHto be inserted here
In order to obtain a more complete picture of Sweden’s relative growth, we should look at the
entire time path of Sweden’s relative income development since 1970, and not just – as in
Table 1 – at three selected years.4 This is done in )LJXUH, which demonstrates that therewas
a clear downward trend in Swedish relative income long before the crisis in the early 1990s:
as early as 1977 Swedish relative income fell below the average for the 23 rich OECD
countries. The interested reader is also referred to Persson (1998), who conducts a detailed
comparison of Sweden’s growth path with the growth paths of all other OECD countries
individually.
Figure 1 Purchasing Power Parity Adjusted GDP per Capita in Sweden as a Percentage of
the OECD Average, 1970–98 (current PPPs).
enclosed
1RWH: OECD is defined as OECD excluding Mexico, Turkey, Poland, South Korea, Hungary and the Czech
Republic.
6RXUFH: OECD, 1DWLRQDO$FFRXQWV0DLQ$JJUHJDWHV±9ROXPH 1999 and
OECD, 0DLQ(FRQRPLF,QGLFDWRUV, January 1999.
In summary, the data presented here distinctly show that Swedish economic growth has been
below the OECD average since 1970. The accumulated effect of the slower growth rate is
                                                          
2 These new member countries were never part of the discussion.
3 The OECD is currently revising the National Accounts switching from SNA 68 to SNA 93. This conversion
has not yet been completed for all countries and backward comparisons of PPP per capita are not available as far
back as 1970. According to the revised comparisons Sweden had the 15
th highest GDP per capita in 1999.
Swedish relative income was up one percentage point from 1998 (OECD, Main Economic Indicators, March
2000).
4 Table 1 also shows that Sweden had the highest GDP per capita of all current European Union members in
1970. When Sweden joined the EU in 1995 average EU per capita income decreased, since Swedish GDP per4
large. From 1970 to 1998 15 countries (“natural experiments” using Korpi’s terminology)
surpassed or caught up with Sweden in terms of GDP per capita, while Sweden did not
overtake a single one.5 Given these indisputable facts, how has it been possible for Walter
Korpi in this journal and in a large number of other publications to take the opposite position?
In the next section I will explain how Korpi has proceeded, and how he thereby has been able
to create the platform from which he draws his conclusions about the functioning of the
welfare state and the lack of scholarly objectivity among Swedish academic economists.
2. How can Korpi maintain that Sweden is a ”non-laggard”?
In Henrekson (1996) I try to document as thoroughly as possible that Korpi has used a large
number of strategies to be able to convey the impression that Sweden has not been lagging
behind comparable countries. In what follows I will briefly outline these strategies. The reader
interested in details is referred to my article in the (FRQRPLF-RXUQDO
1. Korpi often chooses to start the comparison when Sweden is in a recession relative to other
countries (1973) and to stop when Sweden is in the middle of an unsustainable boom (1989 or
1990). For instance, it is not obvious that the period 1992–98 is less typical for Sweden than
the years 1989–90. In fact, a close inspection of Figure 1 shows that the years 1970 and 1998
are “normal” years in the sense that they are on the trend line, while the years that Korpi often
chooses as his end points – 1973 and 1989 or 1990 – are located far below and above the
trend line, respectively.
2. By referring to the catching-up effect Korpi either claims that Sweden should not be
compared to countries like Japan, which started out as a poorer country than Sweden, or that it
is natural to expect that Swedish growth rates are comparatively low since Sweden is/was
among the richest countries. But as already pointed out, Swedish GDP per capita fell below
the average of the 23 OECD countries already in 1977. Hence, the catching-up effect, if it is
valid, should have had the opposite effect during the 1980s and 90s, i.e., Sweden should,
FHWHULVSDULEXV have grown faster than the OECD average.
3. At odds with established methodology and the existing debate within the economics
profession, Korpi has in some cases compared absolute instead of relative growth rates.
                                                                                                                                                                                    
capita at the time was only 97.5 percent of the EU average (Eurostat, Basic Statistics of the EU, 33
rd ed., 1996, p.
42).
5 This is true using OECD data from 1999. According to the most recent, but preliminary, figures, eleven
countries have caught up with or surpassed Sweden, while Sweden still has not surpassed a single one. See the
note to Table 1 for details.5
4. In several cases GDP levels (not PPP adjusted) per capita are compared using current
exchange rates for years when the Swedish krona was exceptionally highly valued (1985 and
1990), while a comparison using, say, 1994 exchange rates would have reversed the result.
This sharply illustrates the point that PPP-adjusted figures are the only reasonable ones when
comparing income levels across countries.
5. Sometimes Korpi displays time series that are not inflation adjusted. But a constant
nominal difference means a diminishing real difference during periods of inflation, which
Korpi does not point out. This fact is easily overlooked by the untrained observer.
6. An implicit point of departure for those who have shown concern for Sweden’s weak
economic performance is that it may be a symptom of underlying structural weaknesses in the
Swedish economic system (e.g., Lindbeck HWDO1994). Korpi (1996), on the other hand,
claims that the lag in Sweden’s GDP should largely be ascribed to specific macro policy
mistakes, for example, too much fiscal restraint in 1970–71 and too much monetary restraint
(disinflation) in 1990–91. Had these policy mistakes been avoided, the average long-run
growth rate would have been much higher, and, consequently, the argument goes, it is quite
legitimate to exclude the time periods when these policy mistakes led to slow or negative
growth! This position is untenable. First, other countries have of course also made policy
mistakes, and in order to be consistent these mistakes should also be excluded. Second, it is
perfectly possible that, due to the stabilization policy pursued, the underlying weaknesses
manifest themselves in recurrent crises rather than in a stable negative growth differential
relative to other countries (see also Lindbeck, 1997, pp. 1284–5). In particular, if there is
some leeway in the stabilization policy to postpone necessary structural changes, recurrent
crises appear to be the more likely manifestation of underlying structural weaknesses. The
macroeconomic crisis in the early 1990s as well as the cost crises in 1976–77 and 1981–82
may be interpreted in this fashion.
7. Korpi tries to downgrade the value of cross-country growth comparisons by emphasizing
that the originally published figures for a specific country are often subject to revisions.
Rather than being an argument against cross-country comparisons, this is an argument that
underlines the importance of using long time series which show how differences in average
growth rates accumulate over time in the form of large differences in income levels.6
Moreover, Korpi in fact bases his own discussion on such comparisons.
                                                          
6 This critique is hardly applicable to a comparison ending in the early 1990s, since data that old are unlikely to
be subject to significant further revisions.6
8. Korpi has often made inferences about the whole economy from the performance of small
parts of the economy, notably the (secularly shrinking) manufacturing sector.
In the special &RQWURYHUV\)RUXP on Sweden published in the (FRQRPLF-RXUQDO in
November 1996 Walter Korpi obtains some apparent support from the Australian economist
Steve Dowrick (1996, p. 1777) who argues that: ”On balance, it seems reasonable to conclude
that at least up until 1990 there is nothing in the Swedish growth performance which suggests
substantial underperformance … It suggests that there is a stiff challenge for the proponents
of the ‘lagging-behind’ thesis. It is incumbent on them to explain why Swedish GDP
performance was consistently reasonable over forty years and only shows a marked decline
after 1990.” Dowrick mostly bases this conclusion on a chart showing the evolution of
relative GDP per capita in 24 OECD countries during the period 1950–92. The data source is
3HQQ:RUOG7DEOHV (3:7) version 5.6 and all figures are in 1985 PPP-adjusted dollars. All 24
countries are included in the chart, which makes it extremely difficult to interpret correctly.
And since the scale on the vertical axis is not logarithmic, a parallel development for the
initially (1950) very rich Sweden and poorer countries in fact implies that the latter grow
more rapidly.
The main deficiency in Dowrick’s exposition is that he abstains from constructing a time
series for an OECD average, which can be compared to Sweden. This is of course a pity,
since the discussion in Sweden has been dealing precisely with the question whether Sweden
has been lagging behind a broad average of other rich countries. Fortunately, it is feasible to
use 3:7 to construct an OECD average and compare the evolution of Swedish GDP per
capita relative to that measure. This is exactly what we did in Figure 1 above on the basis of
OECD statistics. 3:7 version 5.6 covers the period 1950–92. )LJXUH displays PPP-adjusted
GDP per capita in Sweden relative to the average of the 23 rich OECD countries for the
period 1950–98. The period 1950–92 is covered by data 3:7 and 1970–98 by data from the
OECD. Thus the two series overlap in 1970–92 and they have been calibrated to achieve
concurrence in 1970. The two series follow a virtually identical time path between 1970 and
1992. When the data are presented in this fashion, Sweden’s weak growth performance
relative to the OECD average is evident also from the data used by Dowrick. In other words,
not even Dowrick’s own data support his conclusion.7
Figure 2 Purchasing Power Parity Adjusted GDP per Capita in Sweden as a Percentage of
the OECD Average according to Penn World Tables (1950–92) and the OECD
Statistics, (1970–98).
enclosed
1RWH: OECD is defined as OECD excluding Mexico, Turkey, Poland, South Korea, Hungary and the Czech
Republic. The OECD-statistics concern current PPPs while 3HQQ:RUOG7DEOHV (3:7) concerns fixed PPPs in
1985 dollars (variable: 5*'3&+). The 3:7 comparison has been achieved by a population-weighting of the
income levels in the respective countries, and then the resulting series has been scaled so that the 1970 level is
identical to the level of the OECD series in 1970. In 3:7 there are missing data for 5*'3&+ in 1992 for
Greece and 1991 and 1992 for Portugal. These observations have been estimated on the basis of the growth rates
according to the OECD statistics.
6RXUFH: OECD, 1DWLRQDO$FFRXQWV0DLQ$JJUHJDWHV±9ROXPH 1999, OECD, 0DLQ(FRQRPLF
,QGLFDWRUV, January 1999 and 3HQQ:RUOG7DEOHV version 5.6.
The 3:7VHULHV in Figure 2 shows that Swedish PPP-adjusted GDP per capita evolved on par
with the OECD average until 1965. The relative decline does not start until the latter half of
the 1960s. This is consistent with Henrekson (1996, Table 3) where it is shown that the choice
of 1970 as the initial year makes no difference for the conclusion that Sweden has been
lagging behind.
3. The current upturn and the Swedish economic system
Today (June 2000) there is a visible upturn in economic activity in Sweden also relative to
other rich countries. The GDP growth rate was 3.0 and 3.8 percent p.a. in 1998 and 1999,
respectively. The growth rate is expected to reach 4.4 percent in 2000 and to remain well in
excess of 3 percent in 2001. According to current projections the GDP growth rate in Sweden
is expected to be higher than for the OECD average for four consecutive years, 1998–2001.
Aggregate employment grew at an average annual rate of 1.8 percent during 1998–99, and
employment growth is expected to continue at comparable rates in 2000–2001. Open
unemployment is also expected to fall rapidly and reach a level of 4.0 percent by the end of
2001. 7 New entrepreneurial firms, in particular in the IT sector, form at a rapid rate, and
Sweden is widely publicized as being on the forefront in Europe regarding the transition to
“the new economy”.
Should this favorable development be seen as the revenge (and return) of the old Swedish
Model? I do not think so. First, the development is still of recent vintage, and hence it is too
                                                          
7 All data in this paragraph were taken from National Institute of Economic Research, Konjunkturläget, June
2000.8
early to tell to what extent we are dealing with a cyclical effect and catching up of lost ground
following the deep crisis in 1991–93. Second, and much more importantly, a number of policy
measures were taken during the late 1980s and in the 1990s, which taken together have
replaced the traditional Swedish model by something very different:
·  In the second half of the 1980s a gradual deregulation of the capital and foreign exchange
markets took place. In combination with a new stringent central government budget
process and an independent central bank there has been a dramatic increase in financial
stability and a precipitous drop in inflation and interest rates.8
·  The corporate tax rate was cut in half in 1991 and is now 28 percent, which strongly
favors equity relative to debt financing. The introduction of a uniform 30 percent flat
capital income tax rate and the abolition of wealth taxation on unlisted stock have greatly
favored LQGLYLGXDO equity investments relative to the 1980s.
·  The highest marginal tax rate has been lowered from close to 90 percent around 1980 to
roughly 55 percent, which has increased the after-tax rate of return on human capital
investment and increased the scope for commercial development in the household-related
service sector.
·  The wage bargaining system is now less centralized than before, and in particular wages
in the upper decile have increased rapidly in the latter half of the 1990s (Davis and
Henrekson, 2000).
·  Certain deregulatory measures on the labor market have already been taken,9 which in
practice gives more room for flexibility than before, and more measures can be expected
in the near future. A law passed in 1993 paved the way for an expansion of temporary
work businesses and staffing services. These firms expand at a rapid rate and already
employ close to one percent of the workforce in the private sector.
·  The deregulation of several previously regulated markets, – e.g., telecommunications
(1993), electricity (1996), domestic airlines (1992), the financial sector (1993), postal
services (1993) – has opened new arenas for entrepreneurial expansion.
·  Since 1991 a number of measures have been taken that facilitate the transfer of publicly
financed services to private production. There has been a marked increase in the share of
public consumption that is privately produced (Ministry of Finance, 1999). Likewise a
large number of previously state-owned firms – including Telia, the former
telecommunications monopoly – have been or are in the process of being privatized.
·  The replacement rates have been lowered and the eligibility rules have been tightened in
several key transfer systems such as the sickness, parental leave, preretirement and
unemployment insurance systems.
·  Since their return to power in 1994 the Social Democrats have pursued an economic
policy aimed at lowering public expenditure as a share of GDP; the expenditure share is
expected to be 54 percent in 2001, down from 67.3 percent in 1994. Public consumption
                                                          
8 In May 2000 Swedish long-term interest rates fell below the German rates for the first time since the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system.
9 In 1997 a new type of employment contract was allowed, so-called prearranged temporary employment
(överenskommen visstidsanställning), which gives every firm an unconditional right to employ up to five persons
for a maximum of one year. Another 1997 change made it possible to sign local collective agreements that
replace the regulations in the law. This makes it possible, through local agreements, to annul tenure-based orders
of priority in case of dismissal and to annul the right to reemployment for dismissed workers, and to extend the
duration of temporary employment beyond 12 months.9
has been reduced from approximately 30 to 27 percent of GDP and the public sector
employment share is down by several percentage points.10
The above list, although not exhaustive, clearly shows that the Swedish model as it was
known has been thoroughly reformed. It is hardly surprising that Sweden went through a
rough period of transition when agents adjusted to the new rules of the game.
When Korpi discusses what Swedish economists have concluded regarding the structural
reasons for Sweden’s slow growth, he conveys the impression that their overarching recipe
has been a reduction of the public sector SHUVH – see, e.g., Korpi (2000, pp. 62–63 and
footnote 31). But this is not the case. Overall, economists have emphasized the accumulated
disincentive effects of regulations in the capital, product and labor markets and how these
have interacted with the disincentive effects emanating from high marginal effects caused by
the tax and transfer systems. Lindbeck (1997) is very clear on this point. Another example is
Agell (1996) who stresses a number of microeconomic factors that over time worked to the
detriment of a well-functioning economic system: “[T]he kind of evidence that belongs to the
bread and butter of a public finance economist seems to suggest that some parts of the welfare
state had expanded to the point where they risked to impose significant deadweight losses” (p.
1761).11
Other important features of the Swedish model claimed by economists to have been growth-
impeding relate to the treatment of the corporate sector. This aspect is unrelated to the welfare
state as interpreted by Korpi. As shown by Davis and Henrekson (1997) the policy
environment of the corporate sector systematically disfavored small, young, labor and human-
capital intensive and family-owned firms. In fact, the main architects behind the Swedish
model in the 1950s deemed that small firms would be of negligible importance in the long run
(Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2000). The implementation of the so-called Rehn-Meidner model
led to a squeeze of profit levels in the corporate sector when a policy of fixed exchange rates
interacted with centralized bargaining involving strong unions. This policy of low profits was
advocated for distributional reasons. But with low profits the reallocation of resources was
largely to be achieved by a combination of active labor market policy and localization
                                                          
10 National Institute of Economic Research, Konjunkturläget, March 2000.
11 Agell’s stance may seem surprising given that Korpi (2000, footnote 7) writes that Agell, Lindh and Ohlsson
(1997) has contested the view that Sweden has been lagging behind. This is not at all the case. In the Swedish
precursor to their 1997 article (published in Ekonomisk Debatt in 1994), they explicitly state (p. 382, my
translation): ”It is an undeniable fact that Swedish economic growth has been slow by international comparison.”
Their message is instead that Sweden’s or any other country’s slow relative growth cannot be explained by a
large government expenditure share per se.10
subsidies to firms. This corporate policy slowed down the renewal of the Swedish industrial
sector (Lindbeck, 1997). Its effect was gradually exacerbated when technological change once
again paved the way for individual entrepreneurs and increased the role of new firms in
capitalist economies, often referred to as the decline of Fordism (e.g., Loveman and
Sengenberger, 1991).12
4. Who suffers from an objectivity problem?
In his article in &KDOOHQJH and in numerous other publications Walter Korpi also argues that
Swedish economists suffer from a lack of scholarly objectivity. Unfortunately, Korpi never
defines this concept. As far as I can judge, he implicitly ascribes at least three different
meanings to the term: (i) adherence to Gunnar Myrdal’s (1970) urge that social scientists
should be obligated to disclose their own values before they present their analyses; (ii)
unbiasedness, in the sense that the scholar should make a balanced presentation of the
evidence; and (iii) adherence to proper scientific methodology. No doubt, clarifying all the
subtleties involved in a thorough definition of scholarly objectivity would be far beyond the
scope of this paper. Suffice it here to say that as used by Korpi the term very much boils down
to a discussion of LQWHOOHFWXDOKRQHVW\ in a broad sense, encompassing various aspects, among
them the three spelled out in this paragraph.
Korpi’s intellectual platform for his charge against Swedish economists is entirely built on his
interpretation of the Swedish growth record. But in sections 1 and 2 I have tried to document
that Sweden has in fact grown slowly relative to a broad aggregate of rich countries since
1970 (a year located on the trend line). This holds even if the analysis is not extended to the
period after 1990. (There is, however, no good reason to stop in 1990.) I have also shown that
Korpi has used at least eight different strategies in order to try to convey a different
impression, and that all of these are highly problematic. Likewise I argued that the data
previously used by Dowrick (1996), when properly presented, also indicate that Sweden has
been a laggard (from the mid 1960s), despite the fact that Dowrick used these data to draw the
opposite conclusion. All in all, this should be sufficient to rebut Korpi’s assertion regarding
the growth record.
Lars Bergström, professor of philosophy at the University of Stockholm, has made a formal
analysis of Korpi’s argumentation on this issue (Bergström, 1998). Without having the
competence to determine which side is right in the growth debate, Bergström concludes that a
strict analysis of the argumentation gives no credence to the view that the economists
                                                          
12 The interested reader is also referred to the many articles in Freeman, Topel and Swedenborg (1997). A
reading of this volume clearly shows that economists’ concern regarding the performance of the Swedish
economic system goes far beyond the narrow conception of the welfare state emphasized by Korpi.11
participating in the growth debate have been less objective than Korpi. Neither does
Bergström find any reason to believe that the economists are not convinced of the truth of
their assertions. This removes the basis for the accusation that economists deliberately
misrepresent the facts in order to personally benefit from claiming the laggard hypothesis and
that this could potentially be explained by the malfunctioning of the Swedish Model.
Bergström is an outsider with no personal stake in the issue of contention and with advanced
training in analyzing questions of this kind on formal grounds.
Thus, based on Korpi’s own analyses it is very difficult to find any evidence that Swedish
economists have lacked in scholarly objectivity on this issue. On the other hand, based on the
unusually unequivocal empirical evidence there is some ground for maintaining that Korpi
has lacked in scholarly objectivity. This impression is reinforced by the critical examination
by Fölster (1998) of Korpi’s own research in an adjacent field, namely the effect of the
welfare state on the distribution of income. After his critical review of this research Fölster
draws the following conclusion (p. 289): “the presentation is lacking in scientific objectivity,
not only as regards the interpretation of the results but also in the handling of the empirical
material.” Despite that two and a half years have elapsed since Korpi was confronted with
Fölster’s analyses he has failed to reply to the critique.
Forsell, Medelberg and Ståhlberg (2000) provide another recent example of a critical
evaluation of a central theme in Korpi’s own research. Specifically, they question Korpi and
Palme’s (1998) proposition – inferred from empirical comparisons of 18 OECD countries –
that the distribution of disposable incomes among the elderly is likely to be more equalized in
countries where the public pension system has a high replacement rate also for people with
high incomes. This result hinges on the fact that the distributional effect of the payments to
the pension system are overlooked.
Furthermore, Korpi, against scientific practice, refuses to make his data available for other
researchers so that they can verify the robustness and the reproducibility of his results. This is
true even for data used in articles published in high-ranking refereed journals a very long time
ago (e.g., Korpi, 1985), and when the costs for collecting the data have largely been covered
by government-funded research foundations such as the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary
Foundation. If Korpi is concerned that his own scholarly objectivity is not called into
question, this state of affairs is hardly acceptable.13
                                                          
13 During a telephone conversation with Walter Korpi on 24 March 1999 he informed me that the data base for
18 OECD countries on which he has based much of his research in the area discussed here will be made
available to the scientific community in a few years when his own research group has completed all their studies
planned. But since 15 years have elapsed since Korpi (1985) was published, the argument that his research group
needs to protect themselves against free-riders appears tenuous.12
5. Concluding discussion
I have shown in this article that compared to a broad average of the 23 rich OECD countries,
the rate of economic growth in Sweden has been slow since the mid to late 1960s. Swedish
GDP per capita fell below the average of the 23 countries as early as in 1977 and in 1998 it
was 15 percent below this average. Despite this forceful evidence Walter Korpi has
maintained in numerous articles that those who claim that Sweden has been lagging behind
has based their conclusion on ”what with an understatement can be called careless analyses”.
In this article I have explained how, against all odds, he reaches his conclusion. It is the result
of a number of specific and unwarranted strategic choices regarding data selection and
interpretations of the findings: Choosing propitious time periods, appealing to the catching-up
effect in order to avoid comparisons with broad averages, focusing on absolute rather than
relative growth in some cases and comparing levels by means of arbitrary exchange rate
conversions instead of PPP rates, using nominal quantities in order to obscure real
developments, interpreting weak long-run performance as the result of isolated policy errors
while disregarding errors in other countries, and making unwarranted inferences about overall
performance from the performance of subsectors of the economy. Moreover, it turned out that
the evidence presented by Dowrick (1996) claimed to support Korpi’s thesis did not survive a
close scrutiny. In fact, Dowrick’s data shows that Sweden started to lag behind other rich
countries somewhat earlier than previously thought (in 1965 rather than 1970). And since
Dowrick’s analysis constituted an important basis for Korpi’s accusations leveled against
Swedish economists, this fact calls Korpi’s credibility into question even further.
Given that Sweden’s key institutions and economic policy have deviated from many other
OECD countries in recent decades, it is not surprising that many economists have suggested
that the slow economic growth may at least partly be explained by this deviation. Korpi
dismisses the relevance of their arguments based on his assertion that Sweden has not, in fact,
lagged behind. But since there is no convincing basis for Korpi’s assertion, the reasons for
Sweden’s poor growth performance certainly merit close attention.
The recent upturn in the Swedish economy both in absolute terms and relative to the OECD
average provides no support for Korpi’s thesis either. As shown in section 3 the highly
centralized and tightly regulated system in the 1970s and early 1980s has been thoroughly
reformed and many of the previous structural problems have been remedied or mitigated.
Thus, if it turns out in hindsight that Sweden has lately embarked on a steeper growth path
from the late 1990s this suggests that there may have been some substance in the economists’
proposals.13
Walter Korpi does not content himself with discussing relative growth rates and the potential
explanations for any growth disparity that may be uncovered. Instead he proceeds further by
using his own erroneous factual assertions as a basis for accusing Swedish academic
economists of deficient scholarly objectivity and deliberate opportunism. Regarding the latter
he claims that for a young Swedish economist aspiring on an academic career in Sweden she
or he had better not dig too deep into the data, lest he or she may find facts that contradict the
view of leading economists.
During my career at the University of Gothenburg, the Trade Union Institute of Economic
Research (FIEF), the Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI) and the Stockholm
School of Economics I have never felt any pressure of this kind. Korpi conjures up an image
of an academic world I do not recognize and that does not exist. His claim that there is a
misguided view of the welfare state that has “become hallmarked by the professional
community and receive unquestioned currency among policymakers and in the media” is
downright ludicrous. Anyone who cares to study the debate among Swedish economists on
key issues such as remedies to the unemployment problem of the 1990s, the proper size of the
public sector, and the reasons for Sweden’s slow growth will find that there are wide
variations in the advocated opinions and suggested prescriptions. And more generally, anyone
familiar with the history of economics in Sweden finds Korpi’s arguments dubious. The
Swedish economics profession has had a strong and independent position, not being subject to
political pressure – a tradition going back to Wicksell, Cassel and Heckscher (Jonung, 1992).
Korpi’s critique has two parts. The first is an argument about the method of economic
research and the second is an argument about the sociology of academic economists. Korpi’s
factual critique of studies that could undermine his bias in favor of the Swedish welfare state
is clearly disingenuous. But he does at least present data that he bends in a manner that at first
sight appear to support his case. The first argument is thus spelled out in sufficient detail to
make possible a refutation.
The second part of his argument raises even more problems, as it boils down to an
unsupported claim and thus becomes difficult to discuss in a meaningful fashion. Korpi
outlines a kind of sociology of Swedish academia, in which a “problematic intellectual
climate” has been generated where the individual scholar “may easily tend to relax normal
professional standards concerning scientific evidence”. It is quite astounding that such a
proposition is made entirely without corroborating evidence in a paper, which purportedly
deals with issues of the scholar’s use of proper scientific method. Given that Korpi is a
professor of sociology, it could be expected that he would be both willing and able to carry14
out rigorous hypothesis testing when making such a bold claim about the opportunism of the
academic community (of economists). His case would be supported if he could show that
research agendas, financing and tenure decisions appeared to favor the “problematic
intellectual climate” he refers to, while giving short shift to more objective scholarly criteria
(notably, peer reviewed publications in international journals and successful teaching
records). Approached this way, his proposition could be testable. My own guess (of course –
like Korpi – without having carried out systematic research on the issue) is that one would
find no bias in favor of low-quality work that could be characterized as welfare-state critical.
The most charitable thing that can be said about Korpi’s contribution to the issue is that his
claim about academic opportunism could inspire a fruitful future research agenda.
The problem of scholarly objectivity discussed by Myrdal (1970) is of course equally
important to keep in mind in all disciplines of the social sciences today as it was when his
book was published. Walter Korpi’s own analysis of Sweden’s growth performance is an
unusually clear-cut example showing that Gunnar Myrdal’s concern is still highly relevant.
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Table 1Purchasing Power Parity Adjusted GDP per Capita in the 23 Richest OECD 
Countries, 1970, 1990 and 1998 (OECD average = 100).
  
5DQN ,QGH[ 5DQN ,QGH[ 5DQN ,QGH[
1   Switzerland 154 1   Luxembourg 141 1   Luxembourg 156
2   US 147 2   US 137 2   US 138
3   Luxembourg 119 3   Switzerland 131 3   Norway 124
6ZHGHQ 
 4   Canada 114 4   Switzerland 120
5   Canada 111 5   Japan 110 5   Denmark 119
6   Denmark 109 6   Norway 108 5   Iceland 119
7   France 105 7   France 107 7   Canada 111
8   Australia 103 7   Iceland 107 8   Belgium 109
9   Netherlands 102 9   Denmark 105 8   Japan 109
10   New Zealand 100 6ZHGHQ 
 10   Austria 108
11   UK 96 11   Belgium 103 11   Netherlands 104
12   Belgium 95 11   Austria 103 12   Australia 103
13   Germany 93 13   Finland 100 12   Germany 103
14   Italiy 89 13   Italy 100 14   Ireland 102
14   Austria 89 15   Australia 99 15   France 100
16   Norway 88 15   Germany 99 16   Finland 98
17   Japan 86 17   Netherlands 98 16   Italy 98
18   Finland 85 17   UK. 98 6ZHGHQ 

19   Iceland 83 19   New Zealand 82 18   UK 96
20   Spain 66 20   Spain 73 20   New Zealand 80
21   Ireland 55 21   Ireland 70 21   Spain 76
22   Greece 53 22   Portugal 59 22   Portugal 69
23   Portugal 46 23   Greece 57 23   Greece 65
24   Mexico 40 24   Mexico 36 24   Mexico 36
25   Turkey 28 25   Turkey 29 25   Turkey 30
* excluding Mexico and Turkey.
1RWH: When calculating GDP per capita for 1998 a projection of the population in the respective countries was
used. The projection is the result of a linear trend of population growth based on the previous ten years.
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